| 1 | maintainers | change the repository and its settings | their accounts and the tokens those accounts issue | October: an org owner’s token, reached through a leaked admin key | scoped, short-lived tokens; revoke a leaked key at once |
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| 2 | source repo | hold reviewed code | branch protection | October: protection switched off, the release pointed at a fork | protections no single token can lift |
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| 3 | release workflow | build and publish a release | its inputs and its approvers | October: source_owner set to Berri-AI, approved with a second stolen token | a fixed source, approvers no one person can stand in for |
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| 4 | scan step | check the code in CI | the tool’s own maintainers | March: the campaign that poisoned Trivy 0.69.4 | pin by commit SHA; keep tools away from publish secrets |
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| 5 | publish credential | prove an upload is allowed | whoever holds it | March: an API token used from outside CI | Trusted Publishing |
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| 6 | litellm on PyPI | serve the files | any credential the project allows | both: live 2 h 32 min in March, 1 h 43 min in October | none on PyPI’s side; detection came from outside |
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| 7 | signature and provenance | record who built a file, and from where | the workflow’s identity | October: a valid signature, provenance naming Berri-AI/litellm | check the source repository, not only the signer |
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| 8 | lock file | fix every version and file hash | what you reviewed | protects; the example team had none in March | a hash-pinned lock, one index per name |
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| 9 | resolver | pick and download versions | the newest allowed version, and any sdist’s build code | March: litellm>=1.80 took 1.82.8, uploaded minutes earlier | a cooldown of days |
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| 10 | site-packages | hold the installed files | everything in the wheel | both: extra files at the site-packages root | look at new files in update pull requests |
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| 11 | interpreter startup | prepare Python before your code | every .pth file and sitecustomize | March: a .pth file; October: a .pth file and sitecustomize | audit .pth files; Python 3.18 stops running import lines |
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| 12 | process secrets | let the app reach its services | anything that runs as the process | both: every credential the process could read | fewer secrets in the environment, minimal service-account rights |
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| 13 | egress | connect the app to the internet | nothing, once there is an allow-list | both: one POST to a lookalike domain | an allow-list of the hosts the app calls |
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